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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the effect of foreign aid in the terrorism-FDI nexus while considering the 
extent of domestic corruption-control (CC). The empirical evidence is based on a sample of 
78 developing countries. The following findings are established: the negative effect of 
terrorism on FDI is apparent only in countries with higher levels of CC; foreign aid dampens 
the negative effect of terrorism on FDI only in countries with high levels of CC. The result is 
mixed when foreign aid is subdivided into its bilateral and multilateral components. Our 
findings are in accordance with the stance that bilateral aid is effective in reducing the adverse 
effect of terrorism on FDI. Multilateral aid also decreases the adverse effect of other forms of 
terrorism that can neither be classified as domestic nor as transnational. Policy implications 
are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
The notion that development assistance is required to help curb the adverse effect of terrorism 
on foreign direct investment (FDI) flow to developing country is conventionally accepted. 
This is following the submissions that aid is required for counterterrorism effort in terrorism-
afflicted countries since they are poor and lack vital economic resources (Bandyopadhyay and 
Younas, 2014). After all, foreign aid bolsters a developing country’s proactive 
counterterrorism effort and provides finance against transnational and domestic terrorism 
(Bandyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas, 2014; Lee, 2015). As well known, terrorist incidence 
involve threats and violence by some individuals or sub-national groups against non-
combatants, and has far-reaching effects such as, increasing the risk and cost of investment, 
infrastructural damages, reduction in economic output and savings, trade losses and higher 
insurance premium (Enders, Sachsida and Sandler, 2006; Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008; 
Keefer and Loayza, 2008; Sandler and Enders, 2008; Bandyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas, 
2014; Younas, 2015).  
In developing countries, however, the extent to which foreign aid can effectively help in 
counter-terrorism effort will be met with different institutional and governance challenges. As 
argued in literature, the institutional structure in respective developing countries (especially 
the condition of corruption) may likely determine the extent of the government’s effort 
targeted towards the original intention of receiving such foreign aid. Economides, Kalyvitis 
and Philippopoulos (2008), for instance, provides a theoretical explanation in the light of the 
distorting effect of foreign aid on private incentives of recipient country’s government. The 
authors argue that foreign aid inflow pushes self-interested officials away from productive 
work to rent-seeking and resource extraction behaviour. Other authors perceive rent-seeking 
behaviour in corrupt countries as winning a ‘contestable prize’ with economic rewards, and 
foreign aid flow will only increase the size of the ‘contestable prize’ (see Svensson, 2000; 
Economides, Kalyvitis and Philippopoulos, 2008). Building on this framework, it implies that 
the extent to which foreign aid is effective in funding recipient governments’ counter-
terrorism effort will be conditional on the prevailing level of corruption in the recipient 
country.  
This paper therefore tests the relationship between foreign aid flow, foreign investment 
outcome and terrorism when conditioned on the prevailing level of corruption control in 
respective countries using data from 78 developing countries for the period 1984 to 2008. A 
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dynamic model was estimated for foreign aid, which is categorised as total, bilateral, and 
multilateral aid, and terrorism is measured as total, domestic, transnational, and unclear 
terrorism. From our results, we agree with conventional wisdom that terrorism has an adverse 
effect on foreign investment. We also find, among others, that foreign aid dampens the 
negative effect of terrorism on foreign investment in only those countries with higher 
corruption controls. However, when foreign aid is subdivided into its bilateral and multilateral 
components we find, in accordance with the stance in literature that bilateral aid is effective in 
reducing the adverse impact of transnational terrorism. We also find that multilateral aid is 
effective at mitigating the adverse impact of domestic terrorism on FDI, and that multilateral 
aid also curbs the adverse effect of transnational terrorism on FDI. Multilateral aid is also 
effective in decreasing the adverse effect of unclear and total terrorisms on FDI.  
Our finding is relevant for developing countries based on the need to promote aid 
effectiveness and not just have a blanket proposal that foreign aid is an effective instrument 
for counter-terrorism efforts in developing countries. Studies like Bandyopadhyay, Sandler 
and Younas (2014) and Lee (2015) have made outstanding contributions by empirically 
justifying how foreign aid can help curb the adverse effect of terrorism on FDI. The 
conclusion of these studies is one side of the coin. The other side is how effective can aid be 
considering the institutional environment in aid recipient countries, which is an important 
determinant of the effectiveness of aid. We condition foreign aid flow on the prevailing 
institutional environment to determine the effect of terrorism on foreign investment in order to 
propagate the narrative that aid effectiveness for counterterrorism effort will only be as 
effective as the prevailing institutional structure in the recipient countries. In addition, our 
study provides substantive policy conclusions that can be applicable for allocating or 
monitoring aid flow to developing countries for counterterrorism efforts. Noting that most 
developing countries are challenged by prevailing corrupt leadership (Jo-Ansie, 2007; Olken 
and Pande, 2011; Asongu, 2013a, b; Kim, 2013; Efobi, 2014), therefore, recommending a 
‘blanket’ foreign aid increase as a remedying tool for counterterrorism financing may not be 
sustainable, and may not have a long-lasting effect.  Our study highlights the need to consider 
the corruption level in countries before aid allocation by conditioning our estimated results 
based on low or high corrupt countries. 
To the best of our knowledge, there are no existing research that considers the interaction 
between country’ institutional structure and foreign aid, and its effect on the relationship 
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between terrorism and foreign investment. At best, the available research on institutions and 
terrorism that exist confirms that a strong institutional has a negative effect on different 
categories of terrorism (see Asongu et al, 2017). The literature on the effectiveness of foreign 
aid is also lacking substantive conclusion on the interaction between countries’ corruption 
level and foreign aid effectiveness to reduce the outcome of violence. The debate in the 
foreign aid literature has largely focused on the bi-directional relationship between 
institutional structure and foreign aid flow (e.g. Alesina and Weder, 1999; Svensson, 2000; 
Knack, 2001; Tavares, 2003; Okada and Samreth, 2012). Further evidence in the aid literature 
has also considered foreign aid flow impact on terrorism (see Azam and Delacroix, 2006; 
Azam and Thelen. 2010; Bapat, 2011). The notable studies that we identified, even when 
considering foreign aid, foreign investment and terrorism literature, include Bandyopadhyay, 
Sandler and Younas (2014) and Lee (2015). Yet, the conclusions in these did not provide 
clear answers to the research issues that are discussed in this paper.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the research method is discussed and 
outlined respectively in the second section. The third section presents the empirical analysis 
and discussion of results. The fourth section concludes with policy implications. Suggestions 
for future studies are also presented in the fourth section. 
2. Research Method 
Variables and Data 
Consistent with Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014), the data consists of three-year non-overlapping 
intervals starting from 1984-2008. The data type was motivated to improve the panel 
balancing. Also, this kind of data is important in ensuring a symmetric relationship between 
the variables of interest considering that terrorism occurrences, for instance, are time invariant 
events. Thus, its occurrences follow a stochastic trend and its variability will likely be low. 
Therefore a non-overlapping average will create a symmetric trend for our kind of analysis.   
 
The main explained variable is the volume of foreign direct investment (FDI)1 measured as 
the percentage of the net FDI flows to GDP (FDI/GDP). Terrorism variable includes 
                                                          
1According to the 2013 definition of UNCTAD, FDI includes associates and subsidiaries, and consist of the net 
sales of shares and loans to the parent company plus the parent firm´s share of the affiliate´s reinvested earnings 
plus total net intra-company loans. FDI flows also include the increase in reinvested earnings plus the net 
increase in funds received from the foreign direct investor. FDI flows with a negative sign (reverse flows) 
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measurement for domestic, transnational, unclear, and total terrorism.Total terrorism is the 
incidence of terrorism that is a summation of both the domestic, transnational and unclear 
terrorism. Domestic terrorism includes all incidences of terrorist activities that involves the 
nationals of the venue country; implying that the perpetrators, the victims, the targets and 
supporters are all from the venue country. Transnational terrorism includes those acts of 
terrorism that concerns at least two countries. This implies that the perpetrator, supporters, 
and incidence may be from/in one country, but the victims and targets are from another 
country. Unclear terrorism constitutes those incidences of terrorism that can neither be 
defined as domestic nor transnational terrorism. The terrorism data is an annual event data of 
terrorist activities, which is domiciled in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) of the 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START, 
2009).The motivation of employing different terrorism indicators is to avail more room for 
policy implications.  
 
Foreign aid is another important variable in our study. Our foreign aid variable is classified 
into two groups – bilateral and multilateral aid flow. These classifications are motivated to 
take into consideration the debate in the aid literature on the differential impact of these types 
of aid on economic outcomes (see Harms and Lutz, 2006; Caselli and Feyrer, 2007; Asiedu, 
Jin and Nandwa, 2009; Kimura and Todo, 2010; Selaya and Sunesen, 2012; Asongu and 
Nwachukwu, 2017, 2018). Interested readers can consider the cited literature for more 
exposition.  More so, just like the inclusion of different indicators of terrorism, the foreign aid 
indicators were also included for robust policy conclusions.  
Four control variables were included in our analysis following the literature on the 
determinant of foreign investment inflow (e.g. Asiedu, 2006; Asiedu and Lien, 2011). They 
include the GDP growth rate, trade openness, inflation rate and number of telephone users per 
100 people. The inclusions of the control variables are justified as follows. GDP growth rate, 
for instance, reflects the income level of the FDI host country and thus shows the extent of the 
return of investment for foreign investors. Trade openness measures the extent to which a 
country’s economy is opened to investment and trade. In essence, some forms of investment, 
especially those that are export oriented are favored by an opened economy (Bandyopadhyay, 
Sandler and Younas, 2014). Inflation rate reflects the specific macroeconomic shocks that are 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
indicate that at least one of the components in the above definition is negative and not offset by positive amounts 
of the remaining components (see definition in http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI-Flows.aspx). 
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existent in the country, and it is an important determinant of FDI location (Asiedu and Lien, 
2011).The number of telephone users per 100 people is an indicator of the extent of 
infrastructural development in the country. This variable is an indicator of the level of 
infrastructural development in the FDI host country (Asiedu, 2006). These four indicators are 
some of the consistent determinants of foreign investment in developing countries, and they 
are sourced from the World Bank World Development Indicators. 
 
The conditioning variable (i.e. corruption-control) measures the extent to which public power 
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption (Kauffman et 
al, 2010). This variable is not included directly in the model; however, it was used to 
condition the relationship between foreign aid, terrorism and FDI. In essence, the 
relationships between the variables were tested at different corruption thresholds. The median 
of corruption-control was used as the threshold to enable comparative sample sizes for low 
and high corruption-control subsamples. The corruption-control variable was obtained from 
World Governance Indicators. Consistent with Brambor (2006), the impact of the modifying 
variable is interpreted as a marginal effect 
 
Table 1 presents the variable definition and some summary statistics. On average, countries 
within the data set suffered about 18.58 total terrorist attacks per year, while domestic, 
transnational, and unclear terrorist attacks were 14.29, 2.32, and 1.97 attacks per year. Foreign 
direct investment was only 2.494 of the GDP of the sampled countries, while total foreign aid 
flow logged value was 5.55, with bilateral aid flow (5.18) being more than multilateral aid 
(4.16). The corruption control value on the average was -0.295, which is lower than the 
threshold for good corruption control (i.e. 0.00). The average GDP growth rate was 3.852, 
with a standard deviation of 3.467. This implies that the sampled countries are similar in 
terms of economic growth. The value of the average trade openness, infrastructure, and 
inflation rate was 4.118, 1.475, and 2.414. These values are in their logarithmic form to 
reduce the distributions’ skewness. 
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Table 1: Definition and Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variables Identifiers and Definitions Mean S.D Min Max Obs. 
 
Foreign Investment 
FDI, Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows 
(% of GDP) 
 
2.494 
 
3.24 
 
-8.875 
 
26.067 
 
612 
GDP growth  GDPg, GDP growth rate (annual %) 3.852 3.467 -10.933 17.339 612 
 
Trade Openness  
LnTrade,Log of Exports plus Imports of 
Commodities (% of GDP) 
 
4.118 
 
0.534 
 
2.519 
 
5.546 
 
612 
 
Infrastructure  
LnTel,Log of Number of Telephone lines (per 
100 people) 
 
1.475 
 
1.017 
 
0.091 
 
4.031 
 
616 
 
Inflation  LnInflation, Consumer Price Index (% of annual) 
 
2.414 
 
1.384 
 
-3.434 
 
9.136 
 
581 
 
Bilateral Aid  
LnBilad,Log of Bilateral aid, net disbursement 
(million USD) 
 
5.181 
 
1.286 
 
0.765 
 
8.362 
 
602 
 
Multilateral Aid  
LnMulaid, Log of Multilateral aid, net 
disbursement (million USD) 
 
4.163 
 
1.518 
 
-1.249 
 
7.105 
 
600 
 
Total Aid  
LnTotaid,Log of Total aid, net disbursement 
(million USD) 
 
5.550 
 
1.276 
 
0.800 
 
8.495 
 
608 
 
Domestic terrorism 
Domter, Number of Domestic terrorism 
incidents 
 
14.292 
 
45.179 
 
0.000 
 
419.33 
 
624 
 
Transnational terrorism 
Tranater,Number of Transnational terrorism 
incidents 
 
2.316 
 
6.127 
 
0.000 
 
63.000 
 
624 
 
Unclear terrorism  
Unclter,Number of terrorism incidents whose 
category is unclear 
 
1.972 
 
7.479 
 
0.000 
 
86.000 
 
624 
Total terrorism  Totter,Total number of terrorism incidents  18.581 55.595 0.000 477.66 624 
Corruption _Control CC,Corruption control -0.295 0.516 -0.206 1.539 624 
Note: S.D: Standard Deviation; Min-Minimum; Max-Maximum; Obs.: Observations. 
 
The pair wise correlations to check the bivariate association between the variables are 
presented in Table 2. From a preliminary assessment, only the terrorism and foreign aid 
variables are highly correlated, respectively. These correlations do not pose a problem for our 
analysis considering that the variables were not combined in single regression estimation.  
 
Table 2: Pairwise Correlation Matrix 
 Control Variables Foreign Aid Terrorism Dynamics   
FDI GDPg LnTrade LnTel LnInflation LnBilad LnMulaid LnTotaid Domter Tranater Unclter Totter CC  
1.000 0.193 0.430 0.263 -0.113 -0.049 0.001 -0.038 -0.118 -0.093 -0.112 -0.121 -0.011 FDI 
 1.000 0.089 0.065 -0.236 0.195 0.178 0.227 -0.058 -0.021 -0.042 -0.055 -0.004 GDPg 
  1.000 0.296 -0.230 -0.267 -0.289 -0.282 -0.236 -0.206 -0.240 -0.246 0.027 LnTrade 
   1.000 -0.121 -0.376 -0.514 -0.450 0.023 0.072 -0.003 0.026 0.269 LnTel 
    1.000 -0.047 -0.023 -0.039 0.171 0.164 0.091 0.169 -0.038 LnInflation 
     1.000 0.721 0.970 0.116 0.088 0.093 0.117 -0.172 LnBilaid 
      1.000 0.833 0.014 -0.039 0.069 0.016 -0.245 LnMulaid 
       1.000 0.093 0.059 0.094 0.094 -0.209 LnTotaid 
        1.000 0.743 0.733 0.993 0.068 Domter 
         1.000 0.528 0.785 0.052 Tranater 
          1.000 0.789 0.025 Unclter 
           1.000 0.065 Totter 
            1.000 CC 
Note: The identifiers are as earlier defined in Table 1. 
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2.2 Estimation Strategy 
The following equations in levels (equation 1) and difference (equation 2) summarizes the 
estimable model.  ܨ���,� = �଴ + �ଵܨ���,�−ଵ + �ଶ��,� + �ଷ��,� + �ସ���,� + �ହܩ��݃�,� + �଺���݀݁�,� + �଻��݂���,� + �଼��݂���,� + ��+ �� + ��,�  ሺͳሻ ܨ���,� − ܨ���,�−ଵ = �ଵ(ܨ���,�−ଵ − ܨ���−ଶ) + �ଶ(��,� − ��,�−ଵ) + �ଷ(��,� − ��,�−ଵ) + �ସሺ���,� − ���,�−ଵሻ+ �ହሺܩ��݃�,� − ܩ��݃�,�−ଵሻ + �଺ሺ���݀݁�,� − ���݀݁�,�−ଵሻ + �଻ሺ��݂���,� − ��݂���,�−ଵሻ+ �଼ሺ��݂���,� − ��݂���,�−ଵሻ + ሺ�� − ��−ଵሻ + ሺ��,� − ��,�−ଵሻ      ሺʹሻ 
Where the time and country identifiers are represented by ‘t’ and ‘i’, respectively. From the 
model, FDIis Foreign Direct Investment; A , Foreign aid; T , Terrorism; AT , interaction 
between Foreign aid (A) and Terrorism (T); GDPg , GDP growth; Trade , Trade Openness; 
Infra, Infrastructure; Infla, Inflation; i is a country-specific effect; t  is a time-specific 
constant; and ti ,  an error term. The two-step procedure is preferred to the one-step alternative 
in the model specification because it corrects for issues of heteroscedasticity that may likely 
arise from the estimable data.  
The adopted panel System GMM estimation strategy employs forward orthogonal deviations, 
instead of first differencing. Accordingly, preference is given to the Roodman (2009a, b) 
extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) because in the presence of cross-sectional 
dependence, the use of forward orthogonal deviations produces more efficient estimates 
(Love and Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008; Tchamyou and Asongu, 2017; Tchamyou, 2018a, 
2018b; Tchamyou et al., 2018; Boateng et al., 2018).  
3. Presentation of Empirical Results   
Tables 3, 4 and 5 present results corresponding to bilateral aid, multilateral aid and total aid 
respectively. All tables are structured in two panels. While Panel A presents results on 
domestic and transnational terrorisms, Panel B shows the findings corresponding to unclear 
and total terrorisms. The median of corruption-control is used as the threshold. Hence, three 
regressions are required for every specification to assess the baseline effect, impact when 
corruption-control is lower or equal to the median, and the effect when corruption-control is 
higher than the median. For all tables, panels and terrorism dynamics, the first set (second set) 
of specifications is without (with) control variables.  
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The information criteria across panels and specifications broadly confirm the validity of the 
models. The null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR2) 
in difference is rejected for the most part. Likewise, the null hypothesis of the Sargan 
(Hansen) test for over-identification is also overwhelmingly rejected in the most part. This 
confirms the validity of the instruments. It should be noted that while the Sargan over-
identifying restrictions (OIR) test is not robust and not weakened by instruments, the Hansen 
OIR test is robust and weakened by instruments. We have ensured that in the specifications, 
the number of instruments is lower than the number of cross-sections, to mitigate instrument 
proliferation or restrict over-identification. The Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for the 
exogeneity of instruments confirms the validity of the Hansen OIR results. The Fisher tests for 
joint validity of estimated coefficients are consistently valid across specifications and panels.  
We first discuss results that are broadly consistent with all Tables, before engaging Table-
specific outcomes. First, the negative effect of terrorism on FDI is apparent only in the sample 
with higher levels of corruption control (CC). In the same spirit, the foreign aid flow dampens 
the negative effect of terrorism on FDI only in the sample with higher levels of CC. The result 
is mixed when foreign aid is subdivided into bilateral and multilateral aid. While our findings 
are in accordance with the stance that bilateral aid is effective in reducing the adverse impact 
of transnational terrorism (see Right Hand Side (RHS) of Panel A in Table 3), the position that 
only multilateral aid is effective in mitigating the adverse impact of domestic terrorism on 
FDI is not confirmed since multilateral aid also curbs the adverse effect of transnational 
terrorism on FDI (see RHS of Panel A in Table 4). Multilateral aid also decreases the adverse 
effect of unclear and total terrorisms on FDI (see Panel B of Table 4). This finding agrees 
with Bandyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas (2014) in some form.For instance, foreign aid 
dampens the effect of terrorism on foreign investment is valid for the sub-sample in which CC 
levels are high (or above the median). 
The positive effect of domestic terrorism on FDI is higher when CC levels are low in 
specifications without control variables. This tendency is broadly consistent with unclear and 
total terrorisms in Panel B. The threshold point at which the modifying variable or ‘bilateral 
aid’ mitigates the adverse effect of transnational terrorism is within range. Accordingly: 6.666 
(0.140/0.021) is within the maximum range of 8.362 disclosed in the summary statistics. 
There is also an overwhelming evidence of convergence across specifications and panels. The 
maximum rate of convergence is 27.06% per annum [pa (0.812/3)], while the minimum rate is 
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18.46% [pa (0.554/3)]. With the exceptions of first specifications without control variables for 
domestic, transnational and total terrorisms, the convergence rate is slightly slower in 
countries with higher CC levels. It is important to note that the information criterion for the 
establishment of significance is when the absolute value of the lagged endogenous variable is 
situated between 0 and 1.  
In the computation of the convergence rate, three divides the lagged value because we have 
used 3-year non-overlapping intervals to mitigate short-run or business cycle disturbances. 
The interested reader can find more information on the computation of convergence rates (in 
presence of data averages) in recent convergence literature, notably: Asongu (2013c) and 
Asongu (2014b). Most of the significant control variables have the expected signs. While 
trade openness and GDP growth intuitively increase FDI, low and stable inflation are 
significant positive boosts to FDI location decisions. It should be noted that the mean of 
inflation is 2.414.  
Table 3: FDI, Bilateral aid, Terrorism and Corruption-Control 
 Dependent Variable: Foreign Direct Investment Inflows    
 Panel A: Domestic and Transnational Terrorisms  
 Domestic Terrorism (Domter) Transnational Terrorism (Tranater) 
 CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M 
 
Constant 
0.905 
(0.384) 
-0.709 
(0.570) 
4.070*** 
(0.000) 
-2.840 
(0.338) 
6.469 
(0.147) 
-5.76*** 
(0.003) 
0.382 
(0.640) 
2.040* 
(0.074) 
2.123* 
(0.085) 
-5.580 
(0.039) 
5.476* 
(0.094) 
-7.05*** 
(0.001) 
 
FDI(-1) 
0.812*** 
(0.000) 
0.613*** 
(0.000) 
0.670*** 
(0.000) 
0.681*** 
(0.000) 
0.582*** 
(0.000) 
0.554*** 
(0.000) 
0.670*** 
(0.000) 
0.651*** 
(0.000) 
0.676*** 
(0.000) 
0.652*** 
(0.000) 
0.595*** 
(0.000) 
0.574*** 
(0.000) 
 
Domter 
0.022** 
(0.017) 
0.405** 
(0.010) 
-0.006 
(0.373) 
0.029*** 
(0.000) 
0.252* 
(0.096) 
-0.004 
(0.353) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Tranater 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.024 
(0.583) 
0.146 
(0.443) 
-0.086 
(0.124) 
0.052 
(0.278) 
0.021 
(0.887) 
-0.140** 
(0.017) 
 
LnBilaid 
0.169 
(0.318) 
0.358 
(0.170) 
-0.141 
(0.451) 
0.337** 
(0.031) 
0.148 
(0.514) 
0.236* 
(0.096) 
0.031 
(0.842) 
-0.029 
(0.881) 
-0.174 
(0.396) 
0.200 
(0.191) 
-0.134 
(0.468) 
0.221 
(0.188) 
 
Domter× LnBilaid 
-0.004** 
(0.011) 
-0.077** 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.510) 
-0.005*** 
(0.088) 
-0.048 
(0.109) 
0.001 
(0.557) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
 
Tranater× LnBilaid 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
-- 
-0.004 
(0.599) 
-0.025 
(0.472) 
0.013 
(0.172) 
-0.009 
(0.349) 
-0.003 
(0.917) 
0.021** 
(0.035) 
 
GDP growth 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.046 
(0.229) 
0.001 
(0.993) 
0.009 
(0.809) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.052 
(0.118) 
0.001 
(0.972) 
0.016 
(0.562) 
 
LnTrade 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.600 
(0.336) 
-1.264 
(0.231) 
1.889*** 
(0.000) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
1.188* 
(0.051) 
-0.881 
(0.209) 
2.144*** 
(0.000) 
 
LnInflation 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.241* 
(0.050) 
0.123 
(0.422) 
-0.041 
(0.697) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.212 
(0.079) 
0.254** 
(0.019) 
-0.026 
(0.797) 
 
LnInfrastructure  
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.084 
(0.539) 
0.249 
(0.279) 
0.024 
(0.838) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.278 
(0.088) 
0.177 
(0.290) 
0.014 
(0.943) 
             
AR(1) (0.001) (0.010) (0.011) (0.002) (0.026) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) 
AR(2) (0.422) (0.304) (0.355) (0.508) (0.235) (0.388) (0.403) (0.593) (0.414) (0.525) (0.471) (0.429) 
Sargan OIR (0.053) (0.533) (0.652) (0.007) (0.392) (0.103) (0.024) (0.044) (0.530) (0.001) (0.000) (0.086) 
Hansen OIR (0.214) (0.834) (0.736) (0.232) (0.875) (0.434) (0.271) (0.446) (0.622) (0.384) (0.477) (0.492) 
DHT for instruments             
(a)Instruments in levels             
H excluding group (0.494) (0.628) (0.561) (0.612) (0.923) (0.252) (0.524) (0.405) (0.878) (0.443) (0.585) (0.470) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.149) (0.776) (0.680) (0.134) (0.668) (0.569) (0.190) (0.426) (0.390) (0.352) (0.376) (0.462) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))             
H excluding group (0.342) (0.578) (0.903) (0.260) (0.932) (0.586) (0.070) (0.167) (0.692) (0.240) (0.390) (0.483) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.193) (0.904) (0.441) (0.293) (0.320) (0.219) (0.739) (0.935) (0.443) (0.711) (0.611) (0.437) 
Fisher  71.51*** 22.55*** 111.9*** 33.60*** 22.28*** 160.7*** 51.50*** 25.80*** 35.39*** 24.18*** 27.78*** 34.93*** 
Instruments  21 19 21 37 35 37 21 19 21 37 35 37 
Countries  78 68 75 77 67 72 78 68 75 77 67 72 
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Observations  514 300 214 483 284 199 514 300 214 483 284 199 
 Panel B: Unclear and Total Terrorisms 
 Unclear Terrorism (Unclter) Total Terrorism (Totter) 
 CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M 
 
Constant 
0.438 
(0.651) 
1.340 
(0.117) 
3.207** 
(0.040) 
-2.764 
(0.218) 
2.847 
(0.207) 
-7.21*** 
(0.001) 
0.748 
(0.476) 
0.727 
(0.535) 
2.099* 
(0.074) 
-3.849 
(0.160) 
5.115 
(0.190) 
-7.21*** 
(0.000) 
 
FDI(-1) 
0.726*** 
(0.000) 
0.746*** 
(0.000) 
0.710*** 
(0.000) 
0.668*** 
(0.000) 
0.626*** 
(0.000) 
0.602*** 
(0.000) 
0.786*** 
(0.000) 
0.663*** 
(0.000) 
0.675*** 
(0.000) 
0.673*** 
(0.000) 
0.602*** 
(0.000) 
0.561*** 
(0.000) 
 
Unclter  
0.042 
(0.363) 
0.157** 
(0.027) 
-0.054 
(0.270) 
0.036 
(0.521) 
0.059 
(0.257) 
-0.040 
(0.225) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Totter 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.017** 
(0.018) 
0.152** 
(0.042) 
-0.006 
(0.267) 
0.019*** 
(0.000) 
0.116 
(0.194) 
-0.005 
(0.213) 
 
LnBilaid 
0.255* 
(0.078) 
0.087 
(0.574) 
0.016 
(0.914) 
0.239 
(0.126) 
-0.057 
(0.704) 
0.365** 
(0.012) 
0.211 
(0.224) 
0.245 
(0.300) 
-0.149 
(0.417) 
0.334** 
(0.033) 
0.179 
(0.380) 
0.226 
(0.112) 
 
Unclter × LnBilaid 
-0.009 
(0.281) 
-0.029** 
(0.018) 
0.008 
(0.309) 
-0.007 
(0.470) 
-0.013 
(0.150) 
0.008 
(0.176) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Totter× LnBilaid 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.003** 
(0.014) 
-0.028** 
(0.047) 
0.001 
(0.409) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.021 
(0.211) 
0.001 
(0.344) 
 
GDP growth 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.066* 
(0.072) 
-0.001 
(0.993) 
0.012 
(0.749) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.058 
(0.123) 
-0.006 
(0.905) 
0.012 
(0.739) 
 
LnTrade 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.301 
(0.493) 
-0.282 
(0.508) 
1.672*** 
(0.000) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.484 
(0.457) 
-1.002 
(0.260) 
1.920*** 
(0.000) 
 
LnInflation 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.313*** 
(0.006) 
0.210* 
(0.084) 
-0.017 
(0.864) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.263** 
(0.036) 
0.072 
(0.584) 
-0.034 
(0.749) 
 
LnInfrastructure  
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.106 
(0.430) 
0.134 
(0.338) 
0.202 
(0.153) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.092 
(0.519) 
0.234 
(0.281) 
0.031 
(0.798) 
AR(1) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.007) (0.008) 
AR(2) (0.433) (0.730) (0.321) (0.551) (0.502) (0.387) (0.415) (0.449) (0.364) (0.527) (0.333) (0.399) 
Sargan OIR (0.070) (0.102) (0.600) (0.005) (0.000) (0.067) (0.051) (0.300) (0.642) (0.006) (0.128) (0.098) 
Hansen OIR (0.901) (0.356) (0.802) (0.447) (0.590) (0.473) (0.165) (0.873 (0.726) (0.218) (0.882) (0.455) 
DHT for instruments             
(a)Instruments in levels             
H excluding group (0.692) (0.507) (0.650) (0.538) (0.737) (0.201) (0.549) (0.615) (0.898) (0.619) (0.908) (0.267) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.847) (0.276) (0.720) (0.368) (0.415) (0.679) (0.099) (0.839) (0.494) (0.122) (0.696) (0.580) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))             
H excluding group (0.641) (0.769) (0.755) (0.465) (0.813) (0.597) (0.170) (0.590) (0.943) (0.225) (0.950) (0.592) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.887) (0.103) (0.642) (0.381) (0.123) (0.257) (0.257) (0.961) (0.398) (0.329) (0.274) (0.239) 
             
Fisher  101.6*** 46.10*** 74.38*** 34.85*** 56.04*** 35.64*** 68.89*** 27.43*** 103.7*** 32.73*** 28.08*** 102.8*** 
Instruments  21 19 41 37 35 37 21 19 21 37 35 37 
Countries  78 68 75 77 67 72 78 68 75 72 67 72 
Observations  514 300 214 483 284 199 514 300 214 483 284 199 
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Bilaid: Bilateral aid.  CC: Corruption-Control. M: Median of Corruption-
Control (-0.1009844). DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying 
Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher 
statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1)andAR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the 
instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 
 
Like in Table 3, we find in Table 4 that the positive effect of domestic terrorism on FDI is 
higher when CC levels are low, especially in specifications without control variables. This 
tendency is broadly consistent with unclear and total terrorisms in Panel B respectively for 
specifications with and without control variables. Threshold points at which multilateral aid 
mitigates the adverse effects of terrorism are broadly within range, with the slight exception 
of domestic terrorism. 
 
Focusing on domestic terrorism, it is 8 (0.008/0.001) and not within range because the 
maximum in the range is 7.105. With respect to transnational terrorism, 7.1 (0.071/0.010) is 
just within the limits of the maximum range (or 7.105). For unclear terrorism, 4.73 (0.71/0.15) 
is within range and 7 (0.007/0.001) is also within range for total terrorism. Regarding 
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evidences of convergence, the following can be established: the maximum rate of 
convergence is 27.36% (0.821/3) pa, while the minimum rate is 16.76% pa (0.503/3). This is 
only applicable with the exceptions of first specifications without control variables for 
domestic, unclear and total terrorisms. The convergence rate is slightly slower in countries 
with higher CC levels. Most of the significant control variables have the expected signs.  
In addition to the explanations provided for the effects of GDP growth and trade openness 
earlier discussed, two more interesting new patterns are worth discussing. First, trade 
openness and GDP growth have negative (positive) effects in the sub-sample with low (high) 
CC levels. This is consistent with intuition and the predictions of economic theory. 
Accordingly, the presence of low levels of corruption-control could potentially dissuade FDI, 
even in the presence of burgeoning economic growth and trade (Musila and Sigué, 2007, 
2010). Second, there is a slight exception of infrastructure having a negative effect of FDI in 
the LHS of Panel B. The argument for this effect is not very strong because it is significant at 
the 10% level. However, a possible explanation may be the use of mobile phone applications 
for activities that discourages FDI in the sub-sample with high CC levels. This interpretation 
should be treated with caution because the argument is not consistently significant across 
samples and panels.  
 
Table 4: FDI, Multilateral aid, Terrorism and Corruption-Control 
 Dependent Variable: Foreign Direct Investment Inflows    
 Panel A: Domestic and Transnational Terrorisms  
 Domestic Terrorism (Domter) Transnational Terrorism (Tranater) 
 CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M 
 
Constant 
-0.161 
(0.800) 
-1.567* 
(0.099) 
1.184* 
(0.092) 
-5.061* 
(0.094) 
0.916 
(0.678) 
-2.043 
(0.400) 
-0.065 
(0.934) 
-0.955 
(0.292) 
4.764*** 
(0.000) 
-4.189 
(0.131) 
2.858 
(0.218) 
-1.557 
(0.557) 
 
FDI(-1) 
0.820*** 
(0.000) 
0.651*** 
(0.000) 
0.779*** 
(0.000) 
0.722*** 
(0.000) 
0.658*** 
(0.000) 
0.581*** 
(0.000) 
0.766*** 
(0.000) 
0.738*** 
(0.000) 
0.608*** 
(0.000) 
0.733*** 
(0.000) 
0.630*** 
(0.000) 
0.503*** 
(0.000) 
 
Domter 
0.006*** 
(0.000) 
0.034** 
(0.031) 
-0.003 
(0.197) 
0.005** 
(0.048) 
0.014 
(0.289) 
-0.008*** 
(0.000) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Tranater 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.031 
(0.120) 
0.091 
(0.159) 
-0.035** 
(0.020) 
0.042** 
(0.031) 
0.082 
(0.228) 
-0.071*** 
(0.000) 
 
LnMulaid 
0.180 
(0.248) 
0.599*** 
(0.006) 
-0.157 
(0.203) 
0.249* 
(0.051) 
0.442** 
(0.027) 
-0.185 
(0.240) 
0.176 
(0.247) 
0.371 
(0.080) 
-0.184 
(0.284) 
0.212* 
(0.068) 
0.543** 
(0.024) 
-0.226 
(0.106) 
 
Domter× LnMulaid 
-0.001** 
(0.017) 
-0.007 
(0.189) 
0.001 
(0.409) 
-0.001* 
(0.083) 
-0.004 
(0.337) 
0.001*** 
(0.003) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Tranater× LnMulaid 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.007 
(0.250) 
-0.013 
(0.544) 
0.004 
(0.313) 
-0.008 
(0.188) 
-0.027 
(0.309) 
0.010** 
(0.014) 
 
GDP growth 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.044 
(0.227) 
-0.080* 
(0.056) 
0.066* 
(0.055) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.036 
(0.333) 
-0.071 
(0.120) 
0.039 
(0.160) 
 
LnTrade 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
1.250* 
(0.065) 
-0.601 
(0.209) 
1.566*** 
(0.000) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
1.086* 
(0.064) 
-1.173** 
(0.033) 
1.508*** 
(0.005) 
 
LnInflation 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.249* 
(0.049) 
0.193 
(0.133) 
0.046 
(0.665) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.229* 
(0.053) 
0.293** 
(0.020) 
0.002 
(0.983) 
 
LnInfrastructure  
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.122 
(0.501) 
0.148 
(0.405) 
-0.354 
(0.142) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.116 
(0.507) 
0.252 
(0.166) 
-0.324 
(0.170) 
AR(1) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.000) (0.002) (0.014) (0.001) (0.004) (0.016) 
AR(2) (0.463) (0.626) (0.320) (0.462) (0.393) (0.417) (0.438) (0.591) (0.237) (0.448) (0.370) (0.347) 
Sargan OIR (0.529) (0.639) (0.574) (0.009) (0.045) (0.032) (0.346) (0.659) (0.554) (0.003) (0.036) (0.038) 
Hansen OIR (0.473) (0.837) (0.660) (0.195) (0.623) (0.366) (0.505) (0.684) (0.323) (0.194) (0.639) (0.185) 
DHT for instruments             
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(a)Instruments in levels             
H excluding group (0.698) (0.367) (0.697) (0.251) (0.549) (0.373) (0.673) (0.473) (0.679) (0.226) (0.464) (0.620) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.315) (0.921) (0.511) (0.241) (0.569) (0.376) (0.355) (0.669) (0.192) (0.258) (0.646) (0.098) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))             
H excluding group (0.819) (0.496) (0.931) (0.072) (0.828) (0.199) (0.585) (0.372) (0.317) (0.106) (0.605) (0.177) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.231) (0.986) (0.337) (0.859) (0.137) (0.788) (0.375) (0.915) (0.346) (0.651) (0.512) (0.351) 
             
Fisher  40.12*** 33.66*** 83.52*** 57.80*** 34.80*** 168.7*** 32.37*** 35.28*** 41.07*** 33.46*** 32.10*** 47.18*** 
Instruments  21 19 21 37 35 37 21 19 21 37 35 37 
Countries  78 68 75 77 67 71 78 68 75 77 67 71 
Observations  515 305 210 482 287 195 515 305 210 482 287 195 
 Panel B: Unclear and Total Terrorisms 
 Unclear Terrorism (Unclter) Total Terrorism (Totter) 
 CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M 
 
Constant 
1.027 
(0.227) 
-1.366 
(0.113) 
3.734*** 
(0.000) 
-5.236** 
(0.038) 
-1.140 
(0.601) 
-2.512 
(0.253) 
0.874 
(0.351) 
-1.773* 
(0.074) 
3.971*** 
(0.000) 
-5.868** 
(0.021) 
0.926 
(0.641) 
-2.403 
(0.332) 
 
FDI(-1) 
0.761*** 
(0.000) 
0.702*** 
(0.000) 
0.739*** 
(0.000) 
0.714*** 
(0.000) 
0.661*** 
(0.000) 
0.586*** 
(0.000) 
0.821*** 
(0.000) 
0.671*** 
(0.000) 
0.776*** 
(0.000) 
0.728*** 
(0.000) 
0.651*** 
(0.000) 
0.586*** 
(0.000) 
 
Unclter  
0.018 
(0.206) 
0.052*** 
(0.000) 
-0.031 
(0.102) 
0.032** 
(0.028) 
0.013 
(0.237) 
-0.071*** 
(0.000) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Totter 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.004*** 
(0.008) 
0.023*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.164) 
0.004** 
(0.035) 
0.012* 
(0.063) 
-0.007*** 
(0.000) 
 
LnMulaid 
0.224 
(0.157) 
0.516*** 
(0.008) 
-0.074 
(0.567) 
0.272** 
(0.025) 
0.501*** 
(0.004) 
-0.260 
(0.133) 
0.178 
(0.274) 
0.644*** 
(0.004) 
-0.151 
(0.191) 
0.234* 
(0.066) 
0.510** 
(0.011) 
-0.197 
(0.222) 
 
Unclter × LnMulaid 
-0.004 
(0.104) 
-0.009*** 
(0.000) 
0.005 
(0.123) 
-0.005** 
(0.030) 
-0.004*** 
(0.005) 
0.015*** 
(0.000) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Totter× LnMulaid 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.001** 
(0.024) 
-0.004*** 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.378) 
-0.001 
(0.111) 
-0.004 
(0.111) 
0.001*** 
(0.001) 
 
GDP growth 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.047 
(0.260) 
-0.090** 
(0.046) 
0.048 
(0.145) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.040 
(0.290) 
-0.074 
(0.082) 
0.067** 
(0.045) 
 
LnTrade 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
1.234** 
(0.012) 
0.163 
(0.736) 
1.809*** 
(0.001) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
1.214* 
(0.062) 
-0.712* 
(0.063) 
1.686*** 
(0.000) 
 
LnInflation 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.252** 
(0.025) 
0.224* 
(0.080) 
0.010 
(0.921) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.235* 
(0.060) 
0.234* 
(0.068) 
0.038 
(0.728) 
 
LnInfrastructure  
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.069 
(0.681) 
0.109 
(0.491) 
-0.508* 
(0.078) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.136 
(0.446) 
0.186 
(0.282) 
-0.417 
(0.103) 
AR(1) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) 
AR(2) (0.439) (0.599) (0.246) (0.453) (0.311) (0.355) (0.460) (0.618) (0.322) (0.458) (0.003) (0.417) 
Sargan OIR (0.627) (0.397) (0.606) (0.011) (0.015) (0.028) (0.508) (0.620) (0.570) (0.007) (0.033) (0.033) 
Hansen OIR (0.654) (0.638) (0.657) (0.255) (0.437) (0.241) (0.429) (0.801) (0.652) (0.205) (0.622) (0.393) 
DHT for instruments             
(a)Instruments in levels             
H excluding group (0.705) (0.340) (0.929) (0.276) (0.569) (0.480) (0.669) (0.371) (0.781) (0.235) (0.571) (0.392) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.501) (0.715) (0.402) (0.306) (0.341) (0.183) (0.284) (0.882) (0.463) (0.267) (0.553) (0.396) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))             
H excluding group (0.561) (0.495) (0.682) (0.245) (0.733) (0.205) (0.884) (0.484) (0.864) (0.074) (0.770) (0.225) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.575) (0.641) (0.491) (0.376) (0.077) (0.434) (0.175) (0.954) (0.371) (0.878) (0.197) (0.777) 
Fisher  78.52*** 58.45*** 86.59*** 73.03*** 60.62*** 124.4*** 39.84*** 35.96*** 54.35*** 54.61*** 38.41*** 98.47*** 
Instruments  21 19 21 37 35 37 21 19 21 37 35 37 
Countries  78 68 75 77 67 75 78 68 75 77 67 71 
Observations  515 305 210 482 287 195 515 305 210 482 287 195 
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Mulaid: Multilateral aid.  CC: Corruption-Control. M: Median of Corruption-
Control (-0.1009844). DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying 
Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher 
statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the 
instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 
 
From the Table 6 on total aid, the positive effect of terrorism is higher in the sub-sample with 
low CC levels, which is consistent with evidence from the preceding tables. While this is the 
case only in specifications without control variables for unclear terrorism, (and specifications 
with control variables for domestic and total terrorisms), it is not the case in either 
specification for transnational terrorism. With the exception of domestic terrorism, for which 
total aid does not mitigate its adverse effect on FDI, threshold points at which total aid 
reduces the negative impacts of terrorism are broadly within range. For transnational 
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terrorism, it is 6.60 (0.152/0.023), which is within the range of between 0.800 and 8.495. 
Unclear terrorism is 6 (0.072/0.012), which is also within range. Also,8 (0.008/0.001) are 
within range for total terrorism. 
With regard to evidence of convergence, the following are observed from the Table 5.The 
maximum rate of convergence is 28.33% (0.850/3) pa, while the minimum rate is 18.46% pa 
(0.554/3).This is with the exceptions of the first specifications without control variables for all 
dynamics of terrorism. The convergence rate is slightly slower in countries with higher CC 
levels. Finally, the discussion relevant to the signs of the significant control variables is 
consistent with those pertaining to Table 3 and Table 4 on bilateral and multilateral aid 
respectively.  
 
 
Table 5: FDI, Total Aid, Terrorism and Corruption-Control 
 Dependent Variable: Foreign Direct Investment Inflows    
 Panel A: Domestic and Transnational Terrorisms  
 Domestic Terrorism (Domter) Transnational Terrorism (Tranater) 
 CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M 
 
Constant 
-0.085 
(0.948) 
-0.270 
(0.848) 
2.172 
(0.171) 
-3.329 
(0.295) 
3.923 
(0.187) 
-6.540*** 
(0.000) 
1.138 
(0.363) 
-0.076 
(0.948) 
3.431** 
(0.032) 
-4.903 
(0.140) 
4.622 
(0.110) 
-6.530*** 
(0.006) 
 
FDI(-1) 
0.850*** 
(0.000) 
0.599*** 
(0.000) 
0.785*** 
(0.000) 
0.690*** 
(0.000) 
0.610*** 
(0.000) 
0.554*** 
(0.000) 
0.673*** 
(0.000) 
0.629*** 
(0.000) 
0.696*** 
(0.000) 
0.676*** 
(0.000) 
0.603*** 
(0.000) 
0.579*** 
(0.000) 
 
Domter 
0.025*** 
(0.005) 
0.166** 
(0.018) 
-0.004 
(0.589) 
0.027*** 
(0.001) 
0.193*** 
(0.005) 
-0.008* 
(0.059) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Tranater 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.038 
(0.419) 
0.118 
(0.519) 
-0.119** 
(0.019) 
0.051 
(0.260) 
0.042 
(0.792) 
-0.152*** 
(0.001) 
 
LnTotaid 
0.314 
(0.112) 
0.180 
(0.462) 
-0.156 
(0.507) 
0.407*** 
(0.009) 
0.256 
(0.214) 
0.201 
(0.230) 
0.167 
(0.402) 
0.121 
(0.570) 
-0.392* 
(0.087) 
0.335** 
(0.039) 
0.025 
(0.911) 
0.096 
(0.589) 
 
Domter× LnTotaid 
-0.004*** 
(0.004) 
-0.029** 
(0.023) 
0.001 
(0.705) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.035*** 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.120) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Tranater× LnTotaid 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.008 
(0.379) 
-0.018 
(0.595) 
0.019** 
(0.036) 
-0.010 
(0.257) 
-0.007 
(0.810) 
0.023*** 
(0.002) 
 
GDP growth 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.048 
(0.210) 
-0.012 
(0.747) 
0.015 
(0.685) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.040 
(0.235) 
-0.014 
(0.713) 
0.036 
(0.197) 
 
LnTrade 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.579 
(0.378) 
-0.850 
(0.218) 
2.054*** 
(0.000) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
1.107 
(0.104) 
-1.060* 
(0.070) 
2.173*** 
(0.000) 
 
LnInflation 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.177 
(0.149) 
0.096 
(0.485) 
-0.059 
(0.571) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.153 
(0.225) 
0.184 
(0.104) 
-0.025 
(0.808) 
 
LnInfrastructure  
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.011 
(0.940) 
0.150 
(0.305) 
0.038 
(0.800) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.155 
(0.370) 
0.154 
(0.268) 
-0.054 
(0.777) 
AR(1) (0.001) (0.005) (0.013) (0.002) (0.005) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.009) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007) 
AR(2) (0.429) (0.426) (0.332) (0.542) (0.234) (0.399) (0.414) (0.693) (0.334) (0.559) (0.522) (0.425) 
Sargan OIR (0.071) (0.429) (0.221) (0.004) (0.072) (0.041) (0.025) (0.178) (0.155) (0.001) (0.001) (0.031) 
Hansen OIR (0.253) (0.467) (0.670) (0.343) (0.675) (0.410) (0.143) (0.267) (0.442) (0.246) (0.377) (0.443) 
DHT for instruments             
(a)Instruments in levels             
H excluding group (0.792) (0.707) (0.497) (0.638) (0.919) (0.255) (0.740) (0.479) (0.903) (0.473) (0.681) (0.569) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.199) (0.306) (0.636) (0.218) (0.388) (0.534) (0.062) (0.201) (0.225) (0.190) (0.232) (0.348) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))             
H excluding group (0.285) (0.208) (0.880) (0.336) (0.796) (0.430) (0.056) (0.160) (0.496) (0.117) (0.453) (0.288) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.278) (0.865) (0.381) (0.391) (0.233) (0.367)  (0.483) (0.556) (0.360) (0.778) (0.249) (0.725) 
Fisher  96.26*** 30.91*** 132.0*** 43.48*** 38.31*** 163.4*** 55.28*** 28.23*** 44.91*** 32.56*** 27.13*** 41.8*** 
Instruments  21 19 21 37 35 37 21 19 21 37 35 37 
Countries  78 68 75 77 67 72 78 68 75 77 67 72 
Observations  520 306 214 487 288 199 520 306 214 487 288 199 
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 Panel B: Unclear and Total Terrorisms 
 Unclear Terrorism (Unclter) Total Terrorism (Totter) 
 CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M CC CC ≤M CC>M 
 
Constant 
-0.184 
(0.866) 
0.958 
(0.327) 
1.409 
(0.361) 
-4.271** 
(0.046) 
1.578 
(0.484) 
-6.77*** 
(0.003) 
-0.235 
(0.859) 
0.955 
(0.499) 
2.152 
(0.181) 
-4.473 
(0.122) 
3.779 
(0.158) 
-6.65*** 
(0.003) 
 
FDI(-1) 
0.747*** 
(0.000) 
0.746*** 
(0.000) 
0.750*** 
(0.000) 
0.694*** 
(0.000) 
0.655*** 
(0.000) 
0.597*** 
(0.000) 
0.821** 
(0.000) 
0.617*** 
(0.000) 
0.780*** 
(0.000) 
0.687*** 
(0.000) 
0.618*** 
(0.000) 
0.560*** 
(0.000) 
 
Unclter  
0.045 
(0.133) 
0.063* 
(0.086) 
-0.054 
(0.225) 
0.059 
(0.131) 
0.009 
(0.738) 
-0.072** 
(0.050) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Totter 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.019*** 
(0.005) 
0.067** 
(0.028) 
-0.004 
(0.477) 
0.017*** 
(0.000) 
0.093*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008** 
(0.024) 
 
LnTotaid 
0.349** 
(0.028) 
0.149 
(0.387) 
0.001 
(0.995) 
0.286* 
(0.056) 
0.079 
(0.655) 
0.260 
(0.152) 
0.351* 
(0.083) 
0.223 
(0.329) 
-0.164 
(0.500) 
0.393** 
(0.014) 
0.260 
(0.211) 
0.190 
(0.257) 
 
Unclter × LnTotaid 
-0.008* 
(0.089) 
-0.011 
(0.034) 
0.008 
(0.261) 
-0.009 
(0.133) 
-0.003 
(0.346) 
0.012** 
(0.042) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
Totter× LnTotaid 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.003*** 
(0.006) 
-0.011** 
(0.041) 
0.001 
(0.608) 
-0.003*** 
(0.009) 
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
0.001* 
(0.056) 
 
GDP growth 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.068* 
(0.081) 
-0.029 
(0.479) 
0.029 
(0.469) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.054 
(0.159) 
-0.023 
(0.539) 
0.017 
(0.637) 
 
LnTrade 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.605 
(0.130) 
-0.047 
(0.898) 
1.843*** 
(0.000) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.550 
(0.403) 
-0.796 
(0.162) 
2.084*** 
(0.000) 
 
LnInflation 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.252** 
(0.025) 
0.156 
(0.200) 
-0.004 
(0.965) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
0.191 
(0.123) 
0.075 
(0.545) 
-0.052 
(0.617) 
 
LnInfrastructure  
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.044 
(0.777) 
-0.031 
(0.802) 
0.162 
(0.363) 
 
--- 
 
--- 
 
--- 
-0.029 
(0.855) 
0.106 
(0.433) 
0.044 
(0.766) 
AR(1) (0.001) (0.730) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003) (0.013) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007) 
AR(2) (0.439) (0.730) (0.297) (0.575) (0.510) (0.398) (0.430) (0.474) (0.337) (0.553) (0.339) (0.408) 
Sargan OIR (0.066) (0.193) (0.177) (0.002) (0.001) (0.026) (0.067) (0.216) (0.216) (0.004) (0.006) (0.039) 
Hansen OIR (0.700) (0.647) (0.755) (0.437) (0.473) (0.417) (0.198) (0.266) (0.660) (0.316) (0.462) (0.426) 
DHT for instruments             
(a)Instruments in levels             
H excluding group (0.929) (0.457) (0.677) (0.466) (0.636) (0.222) (0.849) (0.592) (0.823) (0.644) (0.791) (0.276) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.448) (0.634) (0.640) (0.400) (0.344) (0.580) (0.080) (0.168) (0.453) (0.192) (0.259) (0.534) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))             
H excluding group (0.592) (0.675) (0.475) (0.514) (0.933) (0.300) (0.168) (0.172) (0.957) (0.313) (0.544) (0.447) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.613) (0.434) (0.787) (0.298) (0.019) (0.634) (0.317) (0.515) (0.319) (0.377) (0.261) (0.370) 
Fisher  100.4*** 53.82*** 101.8*** 44.04*** 67.67*** 42.86*** 81.02*** 28.84*** 138.8*** 39.78*** 43.57*** 123.0*** 
Instruments  21 19 21 37 35 37 21 19 21 37 35 37 
Countries  78 68 75 77 67 72 78 68 75 77 67 72 
Observations  520 306 214 487 288 199 520 306 214 487 288 199 
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Totaid: Total aid.  CC: Corruption-Control. M: Median of Corruption-Control 
(-0.1009844). DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions 
Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The 
failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR (1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the 
Sargan OIR test. 
We have observed that the threshold point at which the modifying foreign aid variables are 
within their respective ranges, with the slight exception of the effect of multilateral aid, 
decreases the adverse effect of domestic terrorism. A resulting policy implication is that more 
multilateral aid may be needed to combat the negative effect of domestic terrorism on FDI in 
countries with CC levels that are above the median. The employment of this range is 
important in order to provide economic significance to interactive estimated coefficients since 
overall interpretations are based on marginal effects. Moreover, given that most of the 
thresholds are just close to the upper limit or maximum of the range, it implies that more 
development assistance is needed to reap more benefits from the mitigating role of foreign 
aid. It should be noted that the closeness of the threshold to the upper limit imply that only a 
few sampled countries enjoy the dampening role of foreign aid in the effect of terrorism 
dynamics on FDI. Hence, more foreign aid is required to make these benefits more accessible.  
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The rate of convergence is between 18.46% and 27.06%, 16.76% and 27.36%, and 18.46% 
and 28.33% per annum in specifications with bilateral aid, multilateral aid and total aid 
respectively. This implies that corresponding time to full convergence is respectively between 
16.25 years (yrs) (300%/18.46%)and11.08 yrs (300%/27.06%),  17.89 yrs (300%/16.76%) 
and 10.96 yrs (300%/27.36%),  16.25 yrs (300%/18.46%) and 10.58 (300%/28.33%). The 
interested reader can find more insights into the computations of full convergence in Asongu 
(2013c, 2014b).  
We have also broadly established that, with the exception of the first specifications, which do 
not include the control variables, the rate of convergence is slightly lower in countries with 
higher corruption-control levels. This implies that the presence of more variables in the 
conditioning information set leads to a lower degree of catch-up among countries with higher 
levels of CC. In other words, changes in cross-country institutional and structural differences 
on which conditional convergence are based are less apparent in the presence of more control 
variables for high CC countries. This interpretation should be treated with caution because 
conditional convergence is contingent on the variables we chose and empirically test, which 
may not necessarily reflect all cross-country institutional and structural difference needed for 
conditional convergence to occur.  
 
4. Conclusions and Further Directions 
We set out to extend Bandyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas (2014) study by conditioning the 
mitigation effect of foreign aid, terrorism and FDI on corruption-control (CC) levels. Using 
the System GMM estimation technique on a panel of 78 developing countries for the period 
1984-2008, we establish that the negative effect of terrorism on FDI is apparent only in 
countries with higher levels of CC. Foreign aid dampens the negative effect of terrorism on 
FDI only in higher levels of CC. The result is mixed when aid is subdivided into its bilateral 
and multilateral component. While our findings are in accordance with the stance that 
bilateral aid is effective in reducing the adverse impact of transnational terrorism, the position 
that only multilateral aid is effective in mitigating the adverse impact of domestic terrorism on 
FDI is not confirmed because multilateral aid also curbs the adverse effect of transnational 
terrorism on FDI. Moreover, multilateral aid also decreases the adverse effect of unclear and 
total terrorisms on FDI. 
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Specifically, we also observe from our estimation that the effect of terrorism on FDI has been 
established to be positive, with a higher magnitude in the sub-samples with lower CC. A 
logical implication is that some terrorism dynamics may not deter FDI location decisions 
especially in countries experiencing low levels of institutional governance (in terms of CC). 
This implies that the prevailing institutional structure may matter more for FDI despite the 
incidence of terrorism and this is likely tied to the confidence of FDI in the government’s 
ability to protect their interest as well as defeat the prevailing encumbrance.    
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